RIGHT TO INFORMATION

 RIGHT TO INFORMATION 

“Democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed.”

Citizens’ Access to Information (ATI) is an essential stepin ensuring transparency and accountability ingovernment systems and processes. When a governmentis transparent, there is less chance for corruption andmore room for accountability. The RTI generally understood as the right to access information held bypublic authorities. It is not just a necessity of the citizens; it is a precondition to good-governance. To be specific,ATI makes democracy more vibrant and meaningful andallows citizens to participate in the governance processof the county. In particular, it empowers ordinary citizens,especially those in rural areas.

When people have ATI they naturally tend to make moremeaningful decisions, raise informed opinions, influencepolicies affecting their society and even help shape amore assured future for the next generation. RTI has been recognised in Sweden for over 200 years.Importantly, however, over the last ten years it has gainedwidespread recognition in all regions of the world. Whilerelated legislations were adopted only by 13 countriesin 1990, this number has now grown to 852 and more,and similar such pieces of legislations are under activeconsideration in many other countries.

In India, Right to Information Act was enacted in 2005 and since thenthis law has proved to be a strong weapon in the handsof people, for ensuring transparency in governmentdepartments and containing corruption.

This short project reports is intended to reveal the Constitutional aspects of the Right to Information.

II. HAS RIGHT TO INFORMATION EMERGED FROM OUR CONSTITUTION?

Rightly as one of the significant objectives of Indian Constitution as the preamble describes, is to secure liberty of thought and expressions to the citizens of India. The Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution, the fundamental right to speech and expression can never be exercised until and unless the information regarding public matters is being circulated.

The right of information is an inalienable component of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of Indian constitution. As held in the respective cases ofBennet Coleman v. UOI, SP Gupta v UOI, and Secretary, Ministry of information and broadcasting v Cricket Association of Bengal.

The Supreme Court of India in Bennet Coleman case while taking into account the News print control order, allotment of newsprint to a newspaper was restricted, held that such restriction had not only infringed newspaper‘s right to freedom of speech but also readers’ right to read was cut down. And the reader’s right to access the newspaper was his right to information which was implicit in the right to Right of freedom of speech.

Similarly, in SP Gupta case the SC observed that “the people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by those functionaries. They are entitled to know the very particulars of every public transaction. Also in Secretary, ministry of information & broadcasting v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, the SC held that the airwaves were a public property and its distribution among the government media and the private channels should be done on equitable basis as the freedom of speech included the right to impart and receive information from electronic media.

Beside Article 19(1) (a), the other articles which give right to information under Indian constitution are Articles 311(2) and 22(1). Article 311(2) provides for a govt. servant to know why he is being dismissed or removed or being demoted and representation can be made against the order. By way of Article 22(1) a person can know the grounds for his detention. In Essar Oil Ltd v. Halar Utkarsha Samiti, the SC held that right to information emerges from right to personal liberty guaranteed by article 21 of constitution.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Since constitution is a living document it needs to be construed in a broad and liberal sense. The construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers may have to adopt since of all the instruments, the Constitution has the greatest claim to be construed broadly and liberally.

The Indian Constitution has an impressive array of basic and inalienable rights termed as fundamental rights contained in Chapter III. These include the Right to Equal Protection of the Laws and the Right to Equality before the Law (Article 14), the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression [Article 19(1) (a)] and the Right to Life "Personal Liberty (Article 21). These are backed by the Right to Constitutional Remedies in Article 32, i.e., the Right to approach the Supreme Court, the highest court in the land, or the High Court in case of infringement of any of fundamental rights. The State is not only under an obligation to respect the Fundamental Rights of the citizens, but also equally under an obligation to ensure conditions under which the Right can be meaningfully and effectively enjoyed by all. However, the Constitution does not specifically mention about the right to information or even right to freedom of the press.

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights to free speech and expression, which, by implication, includes within it the right of access to information. The prerequisite for enjoying this right is knowledge and information. Therefore, the Right to Information becomes a constitutional right, being an aspect of the right to free speech and expression, which includes the right to receive and collect information.

The Right to Information also seems to flow from Article 21 of the Constitution on the right to life and liberty, which includes right to know about things that affect our lives. The expression "right to life and personal liberty" is a broad term, which includes within itself variety of rights and attributes. In Reliance Petrochemical Ltd. v Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and others, the Supreme Court read into Article 21 as broad right to include right to know within its purview. The apex court held that right to know is a necessary ingredient of participatory democracy. The expression cannot be limited to mere absence of bodily restraint. It is wide enough to expand to full range of rights including right to hold a particular opinion and right to sustain and nurture that opinion. For sustaining and nurturing that opinion it becomes necessary to receive information. Article 21 confers on all persons a right to know which includes a right to receive information. The ambit and scope of Article 21 is much wider as compared to Article 19(1) (a).Thus,the courts are required to expand its scope by way of judicial activism.

In P.U.C.L v U.O.I the Supreme Court observed that Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixedcontents, most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour itscontents in the light of its experience. The attempt of the court should be to expand thereach and ambit of the Fundamental Rights by process of judicial interpretation. Therecannot be any distinction between the Fundamental Rights mentioned in Chapter-III ofthe constitution and the declaration of such rights on the basis of the judgments renderedby the Supreme Court.

In Keshvanand Bharati v State of Kerala, the Supreme Court observed, "Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed contents, most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour its contents in the light of its experience. It is relevant in this context to remember that in building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be subordinated to the directive principles. The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the Fundamental Rights by process of judicial interpretation".

The burden to prove that the restrictions are within the constitutional limits lies on the Government. Further, it is well settled that while interpreting the constitutional provisions dealing with fundamental rights the courts must not forget the principles embodied in the international conventions and instruments and as far as possible the courts must give effect to the principles contained in those instruments. The courts are under an obligation to give due regard to the international conventions and norms while construing the domestic laws, more so when there is no inconsistency or conflict between them and the domestic law.

The Supreme Court in case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, narrowly expanded its view on the provision of article 19(1) (a) towards the right to information. It held that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to receive and impart information. For ensuring the free speech right of citizens of this country, it is necessary that the citizens have the benefit of plurality of views and a range of opinions on all public issues. A successful democracy posits an unaware citizen's diversity of opinions, views, ideas, and ideologies which is essential to enable the citizens to arrive at informed judgement on all issues touching them. This court made more clear of the provision of right to information that is inferred itself in Article 19(1) (a).

It held in case of S.P. Gupta v Union of India, that right to know is implicit in right to free speech and expression. Disclosure of information regarding functioning of the government must be the rule.

In going back to 1975 this court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v Raj Narain, observed that freedom of speech and expression includes right of citizens to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. In the year the court also held that freedom of speech and expression includes right of the citizens to know about the affairs of the government.

The Supreme Court in another case of Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, held that true democracy cannot exist unless the citizens have a right to participate in the affairs of the policy of the country. This is particularly so in a country like ours where 65% of the population is illiterate.

IV. CRITICISM OF SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The most formidable obstacle to the implementation of a Right to Information law inthe States and country comes from theConstitution itself. It defies human reason as to how a visibly anachronistic arid anti-people article i.e.oath of secrecy found place in the third Scheduleof the Constitution and is still being tolerated tothis day without any compunction, the like ofwhich is noticed nowhere in the democratic world.

The Article 75 (4) of the Constitution makes itbinding on every Minister before entering into hisoffice to swear by an oath of Secrecy, which readsas follows:

I, Swear in the name of God that I will not reveal to any person or persons any matter, which shall be brought under my consideration or shall be known to me as a Minister for the Union except as may be required for the due discharge of my duties as such Minister.

As is well known, in the typical Indiansystem of Parliamentary Democracy, a Ministeris both a member of legislature and a head of theexecutive in respect of the portfolios he holds.When a Minister, the head himself vows in thename of God to maintain secrecy of officialinformation from the people, how can the rest ofthe executive i.e. the Government servants whomhe heads and leads for all practical purposes, beexpected to disclose official information to thepeople just for the sake of a piece of legislation,called Right to Information or Freedom ofInformation Act? Over and above, there areConduct Rules, Codes and Manuals for theGovernment Servants, which bind them to the observance of strictsecrecy of official information from the public.

The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2000- 2002), whichsubmitted their 1800 and odd page Report to thePrime Minister on 3lst March 2002 have thereforeobserved inter alia.Much of the common man's distress andhelplessness could be traced to his lack of access to information and lack of knowledge of decisionmakingprocesses, which vitally affect his interest.Government procedures and regulationsshrouded in a veil of secrecy do not allow theclients to know how their cases are being handled.They shy away from questioning officers handlingtheir cases because of the latter's snobbish attitudeand bow-wow style. Right to information shouldbe guaranteed and needs to be given realsubstance. The traditional insistence on secrecyshould be, in fact, we should have an oath oftransparency in place of an oath of secrecy.Administration should become transparent andparticipatory.

The Oath of Secrecy apart, the IndianConstitution is replete with provisions, which arejust uncritically borrowed from its colonialpredecessor Government of India Act 1935, andlegitimize and reinforce by the full backing of thesupreme law of the land, an obsolete and nefariousregime of administrative secrecy that is squarelyincompatible with a democratic polity of moderntimes. Such immunitarian provisions of theConstitution as guaranteeing a special manner ofProtection to the Permanent Civil Service of thecolonial style (Article 311), Privileges of the Legislators ( Article 105 for MPs and Article 194 for MLAs), Security of tenure to the Judges(Article 124 for Supreme Court Judges andArticle 217 for High Court Judges), and aboveall Legal Protection to the President and Governors (Article 361), which together makethe citizens stare at the key functionaries of theState with awe and wonder, and which give afree hand to these functionaries to deal with themas they like without being directly accountable tothem, do also contribute indirectly but substantiallyto the maintenance of a regime built upon secrecy,red-tape, corruption and alienation from thepeople.

Unless and until the Constitution is rid ofits colonial self and remade in such a manner asto place the citizen at its center-stage, with all theorgans of power being directly accountable to himand his everyday life, no piecemeal enactment ofRight to Information can bring about the muchdesired elements of transparency, responsivenessand accountability to the governance of the day,over which the whole nation cries hoarse.

V. CONCLUSION 

RTI is a powerful tool that can deliver significant socialbenefits. It can provide a strong support to democracy and promote good governance, by empowering the citizen’s ability to participate effectively and holdgovernment officials accountable. Rather than justproviding information, RTI Act in most of the countrieshas served to be an effective watchdog ensuring all thosecoming in purview of the Act to work in accordancewith rules and regulations, without any irregularities.

Every citizen has a right to impart and receive information as part of his right toinformation. The State is not only under an obligation to respect this right of the citizen,but equally under an obligation to ensure conditions under which this right can bemeaningfully and effectively enjoyed by one and all. Right to information is basic to andindivisible from a democratic polity. This right includes right to acquire information andto disseminate it. Right to information is necessary for self-expression, which is animportant means of free conscience and self-fulfillment. It enables people to contributeon social and moral issues. It is the best way to find a truest model of anything, since it isonly through it that the widest possible range of ideas can be circulated. This right can be limited only by reasonable restrictions under a law for the purposes mentioned in Article19(2) of our constitution. Hence no restriction can be placed on the Right to informationon the grounds other than those specified under Article 19(2). The said right cannot bedenied by creating a monopoly in favour of the government or any other authority15.

Human history is witness to the fact that all evolution and all progress is because ofpower of thought and that every attempt at thought control is doomed to failure. An ideacan never be killed. Suppression can never be a successful permanent policy. It will eruptone day. The Constitution of India guarantees freedom of thought and expression and theonly limitation being a law in terms of Article 19(2) of the constitution. Thought controlis alien to our constitutional scheme. Further, people at large have a right to know inorder to be able to take part in a participatory development in the industrial life anddemocracy. Right to know is a basic right which people of a free country aspire in thebroaden horizon of the right to life in this age on our land under Article 21 of the Constitution. That right has reached new dimensions and urgency. That right puts greaterresponsibility upon those who take upon the responsibility to inform.

The Right to information is a sine-quo-non of democratic polity. Information always empowers people and ensures transparency of administration.But people’s access to information is very limited because of the fact that mechanism is not so effective and man’s brain deliberatively holds back information. The Right to Information Act 2005 seems to be an effective legislation but what about its effective implementation. And it requires aware and educated people who can use it for their welfare. So government first needs to ensure that a majority of population becomes educated so that this act may survive for a longer period and serve the deprived and poor people of this country. Also a high order Judicial Activism is also necessary regarding the implementation. If it succeeds in its purpose it will necessarily increase public participation.

Feminist legal theory

Feminist Legal Theory

Feminist legal theory is based on the belief that the law has been fundamental in women's historical subordination. The project of feminist legal theory is twofold. First, feminist jurisprudence seeks to explain ways in which the law played a role in women's former subordinate status. Second, feminist legal theory is dedicated to changing women's status through a reworking of the law and its approach to gender.

Feminist activists campaign for women's rights – such as in contract law, property, and voting – while also promoting bodily integrity, autonomy, and reproductive rights for women. Feminist campaigns have changed societies, particularly in the West, by achieving women's suffrage, gender neutrality in English, equal pay for women, reproductive rights for women (including access to contraceptives and abortion), and the right to enter into contracts and own property. Feminists have worked to protect women and girls from domestic violence, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. They have also advocated for workplace rights, including maternity leave, and against forms of discrimination against women. Feminism is mainly focused on women's issues, but author Bell Hooks and others have argued that, since feminism seeks gender equality, it must necessarily include men's liberation because men are also harmed by sexism and gender roles

MEANING OF FEMINISM AND IT’S VARIOUS LEGAL THEORIES:

Feminism is a collection of movements and ideologies aimed at defining, establishing, and defending equal political, economic, cultural, and social rights for women. This includes seeking to establish equal opportunities for women in education and employment. A feminist advocates or supports the rights and equality of women.^[3]

Feminist theory, which emerged from feminist movements, aims to understand the nature of gender inequality by examining women's social roles and lived experience; it has developed theories in a variety of disciplines in order to respond to issues such as the social construction of sex and gender. Some of the earlier forms of feminism have been criticized for taking into account only white, middle-class, educated perspectives. This led to the creation of ethnically specific or multiculturalist forms of feminism.

The four main strands of feminist jurisprudence

1.     Liberal Feminism: Liberal feminism is not a strand of feminism so much as it is liberalism applied to women. Liberal feminists believe that laws, rights and freedoms should apply in the same way to men and women. It is associated with ideas of formal equality and equality of opportunity.

2.     Radical feminism: Radical feminists believe that sex differences (i.e. differences between men and women) are more important than any other personal identity (i.e. social class, race or ethnicity). They embrace the idea of an essential sex difference and seek to explore repressed aspects of women's culture, values etc. Catherine Mackinnon is commonly associated with radical feminism. She has argued that the law in general, and traditional legal theory, is 'male' and that legal reasoning enforces men's domination over women. She wishes to invert this. Radical feminists believe that the rule of law and the values of gender neutrality, objectivity and formal equality mask the fact that they will always disadvantage women - i.e. the law on provocation as a defence to murder is shaped around male experiences of violence, not female (this can be a major problem, especially in relation to cases where a woman has been subject to domestic violence and kills her partner). Radical feminists argue for changes in the law and special treatment to deal with the inequalities of power, especially with regards to pornography, sexual harrassment and rape.

3.     Post Modern Feminism: Post modern feminists engage with the philosophical rejection of grand theories, such as those within traditional jurisprudence. They are instead concerned with multiple identities and subjectivities. Post modern feminists are interested in the socio-legal construction of legal subjects and the categories of sex and gender, masculinity and feminity. Post modern feminists are concerned with the law's role in constructing, underpinning and maintaining sex and gender. They are interested in discourse and deconstruction - i.e. taking apart how theories are constructed and developed.

4.     Cultural Feminism: Cultural feminism shares many commonalities with post modern feminism. Their focus is on the celebration of women's difference. They wish to move beyond standard 'rule of law' values, such as gender neutrality and formal equality (unlike liberal feminists), and are concerned with questioning the very idea of gender neutrality. Like post modern feminists, cultural feminists are also concerned with the construction of the legal subject (i.e. is it useful to have equality in respect of familial relationships, or should we use a different approach based on the different experiences of men's and women's - and other women's - lives?). Cultural feminists are also interested in the way that they law may implicitly reflect a male point of view, for example in the law of provocation, rape, or the 'reasonable man' test. They are also interested in the effect of the constitution of the legal subject as male (e.g. the 'reasonable man' - if judges can't imagine women unless stripped of their gender, we need to address this). Cultural feminists are also interested in critiquing legal methods and values as male, and argue for a contextualised approach to the law.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING

During the century preceding the 1960s, there had been substantial efforts to change the law respecting women's rights in the United States. The women's suffrage movement fought for inclusion of sex in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment; Myra Bradwell fought for the right to be admitted to the bar under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; many litigants and lawyers sensitive to issues of sex discrimination raised legal issues concerning women's equality; and a major and finally successful effort to pass the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution gave women the right to vote.

In India...

In the 1960s, a "second wave" of an active women's rights movement developed from the civil rights struggle, leading to renewed efforts both to change the law so as to abolish sex discrimination and to reshape the legal profession so as to integrate women within it.

This effort, led by a new generation of women's rights attorneys, manifested the interrelationship of theory and practice.

The litigation efforts that followed, which posed issues of equal protection in a host of are as such as Social Security, pregnancy discrimination, and parental  leave, as well as activist efforts around the Equal Rights Amendment, raised important arguments about the nature of gender which laid the foundation for feminist legal theory. Although the presence of women teachers in the law schools had a huge impact in mobilizing, energizing, and supporting a younger generation of women entering the legal profession to do this work, the theories of equality and the federal Equal Rights Amendment emerged primarily from the practical demands of activist efforts at lawmaking.

Today, feminist legal theory has evolved into four major schools:

formal equality theory, "cultural feminism," dominance theory, and post-modem or anti-essentialist theory.13 Formal equality theory, grounded in liberal democratic thought, argues that women should be treated the same as men, while cultural feminists emphasize the need to take account of "differences" between men and women. Dominance theory sidesteps both of these approaches, focusing instead upon the embedded structures of power that make men's characteristics the norm from which "difference" is constructed. Anti-essentialism, by contrast, contends that there is no single category "female," pointing instead to the varying perspectives resulting, for example, from the intersection of gender, race and class. The last three ap-proaches are all "theoretical" critiques of formal equality which emerged from the contradictions and political struggles that developed in the course of efforts to implement formal equality in practice and addressed the limits of formal equality in redressing sex discrimination.

The emergence of cultural feminism or "difference" perspectives in the law were largely shaped by efforts to understand the uniquely female experiences of pregnancy and motherhood. For example, the historical failure of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence to address

issues of pregnancy as implicating issues of gender equality 4 had an enormous impact on women's lives and the law. In response,

the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 defined pregnancy discrimination

as sex discrimination under Title VII 15 and generated renewed attention to the notion of "difference" in a variety of contexts.

In contrast, dominance theory presented an important theoretical framework within which to understand the harms of violence against women in areas such as domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment, and pornography. Formal equality (or at least a "gender complementarity" theory of formal equality) was not adequate to analyze these harms, experienced almost exclusively by women, because it failed to address the patriarchal structures of power that led to and perpetuated them. Thus, dominance theory emerged from efforts to grapple with the reality and experience of male dominance and privilege in

these areas. Finally, anti-essentialist or post-modern feminism developed from challenges to a notion of a single feminist legal theory and perspective and articulated the need to account for the wide range of feminist perspectives that emerged from women of color, issues of ethnicity, problems of immigrant women, and cultural differences. 16 For example,

Kimberl6 Crenshaw criticizes feminist legal theory's failure to reflect African American women's experience of rape, 7 while Paulettediscrimination that is motivated by both sex and race. 8 This approach has emphasized the importance of storytelling, both as a way to bring diverse experiences into the law and as a way to broaden the legal descriptions of experience that are translated into law. 9 This theoretical perspective challenges us to address the intersections of race, gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, age, and disability, as well as to explore what commonality might mean in coalition efforts. It also challenges us to move beyond the telling of stories to more substantive change.

There are many examples of how the spiral from practice to theory and back to practice has operated. For example, feminist practice efforts to argue pregnancy as an issue of gender equality led to both practical law reform strategies such as the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act and feminist legal scholarship on these issues. A variety of perspectives

were developed by Sylvia Law,20 Herma Hill Kay,2' Wendy Williams,2 and Lucinda Finley,' among others, and were reflected in public disagreement and debate in the "Cal Fed" case, in which feminist groups filed opposing briefs about whether pregnancy disability should be given "special" treatment not afforded to other temporary disabilities.24In short, feminist legal theory has highlighted the issue of gender in law, and the range of feminist legal theories that have developed continue

to deepen our understanding of the complex interrelationship between gender and law. But it is important to appreciate the critical way in which feminist legal theory emerged from practice, and the way in which new theoretical insights formulated by litigators and academics

continue to reshape practice. Indeed, feminist legal theory, understood generically, has been the intellectual means for argument and debate about issues of equality that first emerged in law reform practice and continue to resonate both in practice and in the world at large.

This interrelationship is inevitable because the worlds of theory and practice in this area of the law are inextricably linked. An unusual number of feminist legal theorists and academics have a background in practice, particularly on issues of gender.' Many continue to work as scholar-activists and cultural commentators on a range of issues affecting gender and law-as lawyers arguing cases, drafting legislation, writing amicus briefs, serving as reporters to state and federal task forces, or commenting to the media-or have moved among these roles at different periods of their professional lives.

Theory and practice are also inextricably linked in this area because of the close proximity between issues of life and law. Anita Hill's challenge to Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court appointment, for example, highlighted more than a decade of litigation and scholarship on sexual harassment and resulted, in turn, in the further refinement of feminist theory. 7 The O.J. Simpson case brought similar work on doifmestic violence and intimate femicide to public attention and, in turn, generated feminist analysis.' Current debates concerning President Clinton, Paula Jones, and Monica Lewinsky again bring issues of feminist"theory" to the fore. In short, feminist practice and theory concern issues of daily life-how women and men live, work, and relate.

These real-life issues engage and galvanize public attention and then generate law reform efforts, such as the effort to educate Congress about sexual harassment in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings,

which in turn generate more theory. And the spiral continues, as, for example, the tremendous amount of sexual harassment litigation that arose after the Hill-Thomas hearings led to the Supreme Court's series of decisions in 199829 and resulted in richer and more nuanced theoretical exploration among feminist legal scholars.

Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

First-wave feminism was a period of activity during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. In the UK and US, it focused on the promotion of equal contract, marriage, parenting, and property rights for women. By the end of the nineteenth century, activism focused primarily on gaining political power, particularly the right of women's suffrage, though some feminists were active in campaigning for women's sexual, reproductive, and economic rights as well.

Women's suffrage began in Britain's Australasian colonies at the close of the 19th century, with the self-governing colonies of New Zealand granting women the right to vote in 1893 and South Australia granting female suffrage (the right to vote and stand for parliamentary office) in 1895. This was followed by Australia granting female suffrage in 1902.

In Britain the Suffragettes and the Suffragists campaigned for the women's vote, and in 1918 the Representation of the People Act was passed granting the vote to women over the age of 30 who owned houses. In 1928 this was extended to all women over twenty-one. Emmeline Pankhurst was the most notable activist, with Time naming her one of the 100 Most Important People of the 20th Centurystating: "she shaped an idea of women for our time; she shook society into a new pattern from which there could be no going back." In the U.S., notable leaders of this movement included Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony, who each campaigned for the abolition of slavery prior to championing women's right to vote. These women were influenced by the Quaker theology of spiritual equality, which asserts that men and women are equal under God. In the United States, first-wave feminism is considered to have ended with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1919), granting women the right to vote in all states. The term first wave was coined retroactively to categorize these western movements after the term second-wave feminism began to be used to describe a newer feminist movement that focused as much on fighting social and cultural inequalities as political inequalities.

During the late Qing period and reform movements such as the Hundred Days' Reform, Chinese feminists called for women's liberation from traditional roles and Neo-Confucian gender segregation. Later, the Chinese Communist Party created projects aimed at integrating women into the workforce, and claimed that the revolution had successfully achieved women's liberation.

According to Nawar al-Hassan Golley, Arab feminism was closely connected with Arab nationalism. In 1899, Qasim Amin, considered the "father" of Arab feminism, wrote The Liberation of Women, which argued for legal and social reforms for women. He drew links between women's position in Egyptian society and nationalism, leading to the development of Cairo University and the National Movement. In 1923 Hoda Shaarawi founded the Egyptian Feminist Union, became its president and a symbol of the Arab women's rights movement.

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1905 triggered the Iranian women's movement, which aimed to achieve women's equality in education, marriage, careers, and legal rights. However, during the Iranian revolution of 1979, many of the rights that women had gained from the women's movement were systematically abolished, such as the Family Protection Law.

In France, women obtained the right to vote only with the Provisional Government of the French Republic of 21 April 1944. The Consultative Assembly of Algiers of 1944 proposed on 24 March 1944 to grant eligibility to women but following an amendment byFernand Grenier, they were given full citizenship, including the right to vote. Grenier's proposition was adopted 51 to 16. In May 1947, following the November 1946 elections, the sociologist Robert Verdier minimized the "gender gap," stating in Le Populaire that women had not voted in a consistent way, dividing themselves, as men, according to social classes. During the baby boom period, feminism waned in importance. Wars (both World War I and World War II) had seen the provisional emancipation of some, individual, women, but post-war periods signaled the return to conservative roles.

Mid-twentieth century

By the mid 20th century, in some European countries, women still lacked some significant rights. Feminists in these countries continued to fight for voting rights. In Switzerland, women gained the right to vote in federal elections only in 1971,[48] and in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden women obtained the right to vote on local issues only in 1991, when the canton was forced to do so by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland.[49] In Liechtenstein, women were given the right to vote in 1984 by Liechtenstein women's suffrage referendum, 1984. Three prior referendums held in 1968, 1971 and 1973 had failed to secure women's right to vote.

Feminists continued to campaign for the reform of family laws which gave husbands control over their wives. Although by the 20th centurycoverture had been abolished in the UK and the US, in many continental European countries married women still had very few rights. For instance, in France married women received the right to work without their husband's permission in 1965.[50][51] Feminists have also worked to abolish the "marital exemption" in rape laws which precluded the prosecution of husbands for the rape of their wives.[52] Earlier efforts by first wave feminists such as Voltairine de Cleyre, Victoria Woodhull and Elizabeth Clarke Wolstenholme Elmy to criminalize marital rape in the late 19th century had failed,[53][54] this was only achieved a century later in most Western countries, but is still not achieved in many other parts of the world.[55]

French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir provided a Marxist solution and an existentialist view on many of the questions of feminism with the publication of Le Deuxième Sexe (The Second Sex) in 1949.[56] The book expressed feminists' sense of injustice. Second-wave feminism is a feminist movement beginning in the early 1960s[57] and continuing to the present; as such, it coexists with third-wave feminism. Second wave feminism is largely concerned with issues of equality other than suffrage, such as ending discrimination.[29]

Second-wave feminists see women's cultural and political inequalities as inextricably linked and encourage women to understand aspects of their personal lives as deeply politicized and as reflecting sexist power structures. The feminist activist and author Carol Hanisch coined the slogan "The Personal is Political", which became synonymous with the second wave.[9][58]

Second and third-wave feminism in China has been characterized by a re-examination of women's roles during the communist revolution and other reform movements, and new discussions about whether women's equality has actually been fully achieved.[42]

In 1956, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt initiated "state feminism", which outlawed discrimination based on gender and granted women's suffrage, but also blocked political activism by feminist leaders.[59] During Sadat's presidency, his wife, Jehan Sadat, publicly advocated further women's rights, though Egyptian policy and society began to move away from women's equality with the new Islamist movement and growing conservatism.[60] However, some activists proposed a new feminist movement, Islamic feminism, which argues for women's equality within an Islamic framework.[61]

In Latin America, revolutions brought changes in women's status in countries such as Nicaragua, where feminist ideology during the Sandinista Revolution aided women's quality of life but fell short of achieving a social and ideological change.[62]

Late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries

Third-wave feminism

In the early 1990s in the USA, third-wave feminism began as a response to perceived failures of the second wave and to the backlash against initiatives and movements created by the second wave. Third-wave feminism distinguished itself from the second wave around issues of sexuality, challenging female heterosexuality and celebrating sexuality as a means of female empowerment.[63] Third-wave feminism also seeks to challenge or avoid what it deems the second wave's essentialist definitions of femininity, which, they argue, over-emphasize the experiences of upper middle-class white women. Third-wave feminists often focus on "micro-politics" and challenge the second wave's paradigm as to what is, or is not, good for women, and tend to use a post-structuralist interpretation of gender and sexuality.[29][64][65][66] Feminist leaders rooted in the second wave, such asGloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, Chela Sandoval, Cherríe Moraga, Audre Lorde, Maxine Hong Kingston, and many other non-white feminists, sought to negotiate a space within feminist thought for consideration of race-related subjectivities.[65][67][68] Third-wave feminism also contains internal debates between difference feminists, who believe that there are important differences between the sexes, and those who believe that there are no inherent differences between the sexes and contend that gender roles are due to social conditioning.[69]

Post-feminism

The term post-feminism is used to describe a range of viewpoints reacting to feminism since the 1980s. While not being "anti-feminist", post-feminists believe that women have achieved second wave goals while being critical of third wave feminist goals. The term was first used to describe a backlash against second-wave feminism, but it is now a label for a wide range of theories that take critical approaches to previous feminist discourses and includes challenges to the second wave's ideas.[72] Other post-feminists say that feminism is no longer relevant to today's society.[73] Amelia Jones has written that the post-feminist texts which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s portrayed second-wave feminism as a monolithic entity.[74] Dorothy Chunn notes a "blaming narrative" under the postfeminist moniker, where feminists are undermined for continuing to make demands for gender equality in a "postfeminist" society, where "gender equality has (already) been achieved." According to Chunn, "many feminists have voiced disquiet about the ways in which rights and equality discourses are now used against them."[75]

Criticisms of liberal and radical feminism

1. Liberal Feminism: Liberal feminism has been described as 'too individualistic' - it ignores structural and systemic patterns of exclusion and disadvantage which contribute to women's subordination. For example, a woman might be unable to make partner in a law firm because she is unable to take clients out for late night drinks - liberal feminists would explain this away as the product of individual choice. Liberal feminism has also been criticised for ignoring the extent to which social and political institutions (i.e. the family) shape individual preferences, attitudes and choice - it relies on a pre-social conception of the individual. It may also be criticised because it rests on liberal conceptions of freedom (i.e. freedom from unnecessary intervention by the state) and fails to take into account positive provision of goods and services, such as childcare.

Radical feminists have questioned liberal feminist's assertion that legal subjects can be constructed as gender-neutral - because women have been defined as 'different' by men, they say that equality arguments cannot succeed in obtaining justice for women. Post modern feminists have criticised liberal feminism's attempt to assimilate women to a standard set for men, by men - why should women aspire to a male norm, especially if we don't even know if the norm is right for men? Liberal feminism has also been critiqued by cultural feminists because the equality of rights approach fails to take account of the social, economic and cultural context, and the relationships between the individual and others which may harm their abilities to exercise their rights. Instead, liberal feminism focuses on the assumption of an individual asserting their rights against the competing and conflicting rights of others.

The final criticism of liberal feminism (and possibly the most important) is that it relies on the liberal political view of a distinction between the public and private spheres - if women are more commonly associated with the private sphere, they are not inside the public sphere of state intervention. For example, the problems of rape and domestic violence were very late to come on to the political agenda for this reason.

2. Radical feminism: Radical feminism may be criticised because it assumes a commonality of experience shared between all women regardless of differences (class, ethnicity, sexuality, disability etc.). Those who cannot identify with the common feeling may feel excluded. Also, some women have more access to 'male power' than others - a middle class woman will have more access to the legal process than a working class woman. Radical feminists see male power and dominance as near-perfect because of it's institutionalisation through law, etc. If this is the case, how can women ever transcend it? They have also been criticised for denying women's subjectivity and ability to speak about their experiences if they don't tie with radical feminism. Again, the final criticism of radical feminism is also possibly the most important one - radical feminists aim to replace male grand theory with female grand theory, but this will lead to falling in to similar traps of exclusion and marginalisation - is it worth replacing one abstract of law with another?

CONCLUSION

As we have shown, the interrelationship between feminist legal theory and legal practice is complex and striking. The interaction appears in the very genealogy of feminist legal theory, as practitioners grappled with women's legal problems and sought new substantive legal solutions for them. In this crucible, feminist legal theory was born and developed into the variety of more nuanced theories that exist today. Similarly, an active dialogue arose among feminist practitioners and theorists about the nature of the legal profession because they were confronted with the problems women encountered in the practice of law. This dialogue led to a flowering of theory when the formal equality approach that brought down the initial barriers to entry into the profession proved inadequate to address the continuing obstacles women lawyers faced, both informal and structural. Theories of feminist lawyering developed, largely out of cultural feminist approaches, and a critique of legal practice, heavily influenced by dominance feminism's challenge to the rules and structures taken as definitional of the profession. At the same time, feminist practitioners accumulated evidence about problems, lobbied for changes, and experimented with different ways in which to structure their own practice of law. In short, the interrelationship between theory and practice has generated and enriched feminist legal theory, resulted in innovative feminist lawmaking efforts, and produced important critiques of the legal profession.

The Female Body and the Law strives to move the focus of femrinist discussion away from sameness/difference and dominance/subordination to a pluralist, multiple, and open-ended notion of "differences." Although Eisenstein is not entirely successful in this regard, the care and attention she devotes to the question of sexual equality, her attempts to disentangle intricate philosophical problems, and the visionary glimpse she provides of a radically egalitarian world are all to be applauded.

Unfortunately, how we are to bring about this "equality that recognizes the richness of differences" (p 206) remains unclear. Eisenstein ultimately concedes that for the present, we must work within the confines of liberal law to achieve our goals, balancing "specificity" or "similarity"

approaches depending upon the circumstance: We are going to feel weary in this domain" (p 221), Eisenstein acknowledges, but perhaps we would feel less so if her analyses were themselves more tangible and straightforward. To those already familiar